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II. Legislative and Regulatory Developments
There have not been any significant legislative or regulatory
developments affecting Texas oil and gas law from August 1, 2021 to July
31, 2022.
III. Judicial Developments
A. Hlavinka v. HSC Pipeline Partnership, LLC 1
In February of 2022, the Supreme Court of Texas heard an eminent
domain dispute to decide whether a pipeline company had demonstrated
common-carrier status with eminent domain authority to condemn an
easement and construct a pipeline.2
Landowners, Terrance J. Hlavinka, Kenneth Hlavinka, Tres Bayou
Farms, LP, and Terrance Hlavinka Cattle Company, challenged HSC
Pipeline Partnership, LLC’s (“HSC”) right to condemn, arguing that
“transport of polymer-grade propylene does not grant the pipeline company
common-carrier status, and that the company’s transport to an unaffiliated
customer is insufficient to demonstrate that such transport is for public
use.”3 HSC sought to exclude past sales of pipeline easements across the
property as evidence of the value of the easement that the pipeline company
seeks to condemn.4
The Hlavinkas own four tracts of land in Brazoria County.5 A
representative of the Hlavinka family, Terrance Hlavinka, who runs the
family business, testified that the family’s primary purpose in acquiring
land was to sell pipeline easements.6 Prior to this suit, the Hlavinka’s land
had approximately twenty-five easements on it, including one for which the
family received $3.45 million and another for which it received $2 million.7
This testimony was excluded at trial.8
In 2017, HSC installed its pipeline on the Hlavinka’s property adjacent
to two existing pipelines.9 HSC initiated condemnation proceedings to
condemn 6.41 acres of the property for an easement 30 feet wide and 1.8
1. Hlavinka v. HSC Pipeline P’ship, LLC, No. 20-0567, 65 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1234, 2022
WL 1696443 (Tex. May 27, 2022).
2. Id.
3. Id. at *1.
4. Id.
5. Id. at *2.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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miles long after the Hlavinkas rejected HSC’s offer to purchase a pipeline
easement.10 The Hlavinkas sought dismissal of HSC’s suit challenging
HSC’s power to exercise common-carrier eminent domain authority.11 HSC
sought a legal determination as to its common-carrier status.12 The trial
court granted HSC’s motion for summary judgment and proceeded to a
determination of the value of the land HSC had taken for the pipeline
easement.13
The Hlavinkas gave testimony that the highest and best use of the land
was for pipeline development and calculated a valuation of $3.3 million.14
HSC requested the exclusion of Hlavinka’s testimony.15 The trial court
granted HSC’s motion, leaving the value of the property taken to be based
on testimony regarding agricultural value.16 The trial court awarded the
Hlavinkas $132,293.36, being $108,967.36 for crop and surface damage
and $23,326.00 for the easements.17 The Hlavinkas appealed.18 The Court
of Appeals held that Business Organizations Code Section 2.105 grants
condemnation authority to common-carrier pipelines that carry oil products
or liquefied minerals, and that polymer-grade propylene is an “oil product”
under that section.19 The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court decision
on two issues: (1) that the pipeline satisfied the public use requirement and
(2) the exclusion of the Hlavinkas valuation testimony.20 Both parties
appealed.21
The Supreme Court of Texas held that Business Organizations Code
Section 2.105 explicitly confers the condemnation “rights and powers”
found in Natural Resources Code Sections 111.019 through 111.022 “for
those common-carrier pipelines that transport the products that Section
2.105 identifies.”22 Further, the Court held that HSC established that
polymer-grade propylene is an “oil product” within the meaning of that
section because it is a derivative of crude petroleum.23
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6
Id.
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The Court also addressed whether HSC’s pipeline served a public use.24
The Court has established the test for determining public use in this context:
“a pipeline serves a public use as a matter of law if it is reasonably probable
that, in the future, the pipeline will serve even one customer unaffiliated
with the pipeline owner.”25 The Hlavinkas argued that there should be an
additional requirement; the manufacturer of the transported product must
also have no affiliation with the pipeline owner.26 The court of appeals
concluded that a jury must resolve such a question, but the Supreme Court
of Texas declined to add this additional requirement to the test for common
carrier status.27
The Court held that this would inject substantial uncertainty into multiparcel infrastructure development, risking inconsistent adjudications among
multiple triers of fact, and that the ultimate question of whether something
is a public use is to be decided by the courts as a matter of law.28
Accordingly, the Court held that the HSC pipeline served at least one
unaffiliated customer, and thus established that the pipeline served a public
use.29
Finally, the Court determined that the Hlavinkas valuation testimony was
appropriate because a condemnor must pay a fair price for the value of the
land taken, and evidence of recent arms’ length transactions that precede
the taking are admissible to establish the property’s highest and best use,
and its market value.30 The Court remanded the case to the trial court for a
determination of the fair market value of the property.
2. Henry v. Smith 31
In Henry v. Smith, the Court of Appeals for the Second Appellate District
of Texas addressed the issue of whether pipeline burial covenants in oil and
gas leases were covenants running with the surface, or whether the interests
in said covenants were severed at the time of the post-lease mineral
severance and therefore instead ran with the mineral estate. The court
ultimately decided that the pipeline burial covenant was conveyed with the

24. Id. at *7.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at *8.
29. Id.
30. Id. at *9.
31. Henry v. Smith, 637 S.W.3d 226 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2021), reh'g denied (Dec.
16, 2021), review denied (June 17, 2022).
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surface, as there was no express reservation or detachment of the covenants
in the discussed severance deeds.
Appellants Robert H. Henry, among others, (“Surface Owners”) were the
owners of the surface of a 15,000-acre tract of agricultural land in Archer
County, Texas. Appellees George Ray Smith, among others, (“Lessees”)
were the lessees of three oil and gas leases pertaining to the tract. Each of
the three leases contained special surface covenants, including one that
required the Lessees to bury oil and gas pipelines to a certain depth at the
request of the lessor.32 When the leases were originally executed, the lessors
owned both the surface and mineral estates; however, the surface estate was
severed from the mineral estate by 1984 and 1994 deeds, which conveyed
the surface “together with all singular rights and appurtenances thereto…”
and “together with all improvements, structures and fixtures located thereon
and all rights and appurtenances pertaining thereto,” respectively.33 In the
severance deeds, the grantors reserved “all of Grantor’s rights, titles,
interests and estates in and to the oil, gas and other minerals . . . . and all
rights and appurtenances pertaining thereto”34 Therefore, the question arose
whether the covenants contained in the leases regarding the surface estates
were conveyed with the surface estates or reserved with the mineral estates.
The Surface Owners subsequently requested that the Lessees bury all flow
lines pursuant to the covenants contained in the oil and gas leases. The
Lessees refused, taking the position that the Surface Owners could not
enforce the covenants because the covenants had been severed from the
surface estate through the severance of the oil and gas from the surface
estate and, as such, the covenants no longer belonged to the Surface
Owners.35 The trial court ruled in favor of the Lessees.36
On appeal, the appellate court disagreed and found that a pipeline burial
covenant is attached to the surface and therefore generally runs with the
land and is conveyed through a deed conveying the surface.37 In order to
deviate from this general rule, a reservation or exception of the burial
covenant must be expressly made.38 The law disfavors reservations and will
therefore not imply a reservation where one is not expressly made; the court

32. Id. at 230-32.
33. Id. at 232.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 232-33.
37. Id. at 234 (see Mobil Oil Corp. v. Brennan, 385 F.2d 951, 953–54 (5th Cir. 1967)).
38. Id.; see Farm & Ranch Invs., Ltd. v. Titan Operating, L.L.C., 369 S.W.3d 679, 681
(Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2012) pet. denied.
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found that the severance deeds did not make such express reservations and
refused to imply a reservation regarding the covenants in this case.39
C. Foote v. Texcel Exploration, Inc.40
In Foote v. Texcel Exploration, Inc., cattle ranchers sued Texcel after
nearly 300 of their cattle were killed or injured from ingesting oil.41 The
cattle owners claimed that Texcel negligently failed to construct and
maintain an adequate fence around the wellsite and tank battery on their
leased land.42 At the trial court, the jury determined that the cattle were not
licensees and the cattle owners took nothing.43 The Eastland Court of
Appeals affirmed.44
The oil and gas operations took place on the Hertel Lease. 45 The Lease
was adjacent to a tract of land that was used for wheat and cattle grazing.46
When Texcel was notified that the cattle were going to be turned out on the
adjacent land Texcel worked to make sure that the electric fence
surrounding the Hertel Lease was working.47 In April of 2017 “the cattle
pushed through the fence and broke a PVC pipe on a tank holding saltwater
and oil, which caused a spill.”48 The spill caused hundreds of cattle to be
injured and 132 died.49
The appellants did not attempt to obtain jury findings on the established
law found in Satanta Oil Co., which says that the owner of the surface
estate must prove that the mineral lessee or operator willfully injured the
surface owner or lessee’s cattle or negligently caused injury to the cattle by
using more land than was reasonably necessary.50 Instead, Foote sought to
“expand the law by asserting that the law applicable to protect persons from
a premises defect should be extended to their cattle.”51 The appellants
argued that the cattle were invitees because they were present for the

39. Id. at 234-36.
40. 640 S.W.3d 574 (Tex. App.–Eastland 2022).
41. Id. at 579.
42. Id. at 578.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 579.
48. .Id.
49. .Id.
50. .Id. at 580 (citing Satanta Oil Co. v. Henderson, 855 S.W.2d 888, 889-90 (Tex.
App.–El Paso 1993)).
51. .Id. at 581.
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mutual benefit of the surface owner and the surface lessee.52 Specifically,
they said “because Foote was in business with the farmer-lessee and the
landowner, his status is extended to his cattle for the entire premises,
including the area where Texcel was conducting oil and gas operations.”53
The court did not find this argument compelling however, deciding that
as a matter of law the evidence established that the cattle did not have the
status of invitees on the area where the oil and gas operations were
occurring.54 It determined that the governing rule “likens wandering cattle
and other domestic animals to trespassers upon the legitimate area of
operations of the oil driller or producer.”55 Because the duty owed to a
trespasser is only to refrain from injuring him through willful or gross
negligence, the appellants were unable to recover.56 Additionally, Brown v.
Lundell held that an operator has no duty to fence or prevent livestock from
entering an area used for oil and gas operations.57 This meant Texcel could
not be liable for allegedly inadequately building and maintaining the
fence.58 Foote’s only avenue for relief would have been to prove that Texcel
negligently exceeded their allotted reasonable use of the land.59 Foote’s
alternative argument, that the cattle were poisoned on the part of the
premise where they were indisputably invitees, was also unavailing.60
Although fluids did escape the fenced area, it was the cattle that caused the
fluid to escape in the first place.61
D. Rosetta Resources Operating, LP v. Martin, 645 S.W.3d 212 (Tex.
2022) 62
In Rosetta Resources Operating, LP v. Martin, the Supreme Court of
Texas considered the application of an express covenant to protect against
drainage in an oil and gas lease addendum; specifically, whether an offset
well clause imposed a general duty on the lessee to protect against all
drainage, even when the draining well itself did not trigger such duty.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

.Id. at 580.
.Id. at 580-81.
.Id. at 581.
.Id. at 582 (citing Gen. Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken, 344 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tex. 1961)).
.Id.
.Brown v. Lundell, 344 S.W.2d 863, 865–66 (Tex. 1961).
.Id. at 584.
.Id. at 582.
.Id.
.Id. at 583.
645 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. 2022), reh'g denied (June 17, 2022).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

468

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 8

Here, a series of leases contained the following provision:
. . . in the event a well is drilled on or in a unit containing part of
this acreage or is drilled on acreage adjoining this Lease, the
Lessor [sic], or its agent(s) shall protect the Lessee’s [sic]
undrilled acreage from drainage and in the opinions of
reasonable and prudent operations, drainage is occurring on the
un-drilled acreage, even though the draining well is located over
three hundred thirty (330) feet from the un-drilled acreage, the
Lessee shall spud an offset well on said un-drilled acreage or on
a unit containing said acreage within twelve (12) months from
the date the drainage began or release the acreage which is undrilled or is not a part of a unit which is held by production.63
The lessees subsequently formed a pooled unit partially including the lands
covered by said leases and drilled a well, known as the Martin Well. Then,
the lessee drilled a well known as the Simmons Well approximately 1.5
miles away on a separate, nonadjacent unit. The lessors brought an action
against the lessees, alleging breach of contract for failing to protect the
undrilled leased acreage from drainage from the neighboring unit.64 The
trial court ruled in favor of the lessee, while the court of appeals disagreed
and ultimately concluded that the Martin Well triggered both a general duty
to protect against drainage and a specific obligation to spud an offset well
or release the undrilled acreage if, “in the opinions of reasonable and
prudent operations, drainage is occurring on the un-drilled acreage.”65
The Supreme Court of Texas cautioned that its decision may not prove to
be useful guidance for determining how covenants to protect against
drainage typically function, as the provision analyzed suffered “‘from both
a lack of accuracy and a lack of clarity,’ including typographical and
grammatical errors.”66 Nevertheless, the court found that the provision was
ambiguous because there were two reasonable interpretations of its
meaning, specifically regarding whether the Martin Well triggered the
lessee’s obligation to protect against drainage from the Simmons Well.67
Therefore, because a fact issue remained on the breach of lease claim,
summary judgment was not proper for either party and the case was
remanded for further proceedings on the same.68
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 217.
Id.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 220.
Id. at 222-225.
Id. at 228.
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E. Nettye Engler Energy, LP v. BlueStone Nat. Res. II, LLC 69
On February 4, 2022, the Texas Supreme Court answered whether and to
what extent a royalty interest bears a proportionate share of postproduction
costs. In its opinion, the Court agreed with the appeals court findings that,
in mineral disputes, delivery occurs at the gathering pipeline and that it was
unnecessary to limit the delivery location to a specific pipeline nor prohibit
delivery to a pipeline at or near the well.70 However, it disagreed with its
reasoning that a precedent case, Burlington Resources,71 established the rule
that the phrase “into the pipeline” was equivalent to “at the well,” and
creates valuation or delivery point “at the wellhead or nearby.”72 Instead, it
reasoned that a gas gathering pipeline is a “pipeline” in plain, grammatical,
and ordinary language, and that since nothing in the deed prohibited the
delivery of Nettye Engler Energy, LP’s (“Engler’s”) royalty from being
located at or near the well, Engler’s royalty interest bears its share of gas
gathering and processing costs.73
This case concerned the interpretation of a 1986 mineral deed reserving
an in-kind, non-participating royalty interest, with delivery of the fractional
share "free of cost in the pipeline, if any, otherwise free of cost at the mouth
of the well or mine[.]"74 The parties, Engler and BlueStone Natural
Resources II, LLC (“Bluestone,”) agreed that royalty was free of production
costs and postproduction costs incurred prior to delivery into the pipeline
but disagreed about where the “pipeline” began for purposes of determining
delivery under the terms of the deed in question, which significantly
affected the royalty payments Engler would receive. Engler subsequently
sued Bluestone for common-law conversion of royalty payments and
argued that delivery occurred downstream of the wellsite at the
transportation pipeline. Bluestone, on the other hand, argued that delivery
occurred in the gathering pipelines at the wellsite, which burdened the
royalty interest with all postproduction costs from that point until the gas
was sold. The trial court agreed with Engler, but the court of appeals
reversed and entered judgment in Bluestone’s favor, reasoning that a
precedent case, Burlington Resources, established the rule that the phrase

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

639 S.W.3d 682 (Tex. 2022).
Id.
573 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. 2019).
Nettye at 689.
Id. at 694.
Id. at 686.
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“into the pipeline” was equivalent to “at the well,” and creates valuation or
delivery point “at the wellhead or nearby.”75
Writing for the majority, Justice Devine rejected the argument that
Burlington Resources set forth a bright-line rule that interprets the language
"into the pipeline" and other similar phrases would always mean an "at the
well" valuation point. Instead, the court’s reasoning in Burlington
Resources was that "all contracts . . . are to be construed as a whole to
ascertain the parties' intent from the language they used to express their
agreement."76 If a contract is unambiguous, external evidence added to
change or alter the deed’s language should be rejected. Rather, the facts and
circumstances surrounding that deed should merely clarify the meaning and
terms expressed within it. The court, applying this reasoning, analyzed the
deed similar to a plain meaning approach and relied on contemporaneous
dictionary definitions, industry manuals, and applicable portions of Texas
statutes and caselaw.77 Thus, the court held that a gathering pipeline “is a
pipeline in the ordinary, industry and regulatory meaning of the term.”78
Here, Bluestone discharged its royalty obligations by the terms within
the deed and properly deducted postproduction costs incurred after delivery
into the gas gathering system located on the wellsite. 79 This creates
significant implications down the road, as depending on the specific deed or
lease language in issue, there may be opportunities for oil and gas
companies to deduct postproduction costs associated with gathering
pipelines when calculating royalties. Thus, from here on out, those within
oil and gas industry should be aware that Texas law will require courts to
analyze contract disputes on the parties’ specific chosen language and
closely analyze the particular deed or lease language at issue before
changing its current royalty calculation process to deduct gathering costs as
postproduction costs.
F. EP Energy E&P Co., L.P. v. Storey Minerals, Ltd.80
In 2009, the parties entered into three identical oil and gas leases
containing Most Favored Nations (“MFN”) clauses. Article II of the leases
required EP Energy E&P Company, L.P. (“EP Energy”) to pay $500 in
bonuses per net mineral acre for the right to lease the real property.81 EP
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 686-88.
Id. at 685.
Id. at 692-94.
Id. at 691.
Id. at 696.
04-19-00534-CV, 2022 WL 223253 (Tex. App.–San Antonio Jan. 26, 2022).
Id. at *2.
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Energy acquired two additional leases triggering the requirement to amend
and pay additional bonuses.82 The parties disagreed on the amounts due for
bonuses, and Storey Minerals, Ltd., Maltsberger/Storey Ranch, LLC, and
Rene R. Barrientos, Ltd. (“MSB”) filed suit for breach of the leases.83
MSB moved for summary judgment arguing that EP Energy breached
the MFN clause by failing to amend the leases and pay higher bonuses.84
MSB sought damages and specific performance; EP Energy moved for
summary judgment, arguing that plain language and surrounding
circumstances established it did not breach the clause because it provided
an amendment to the leases and offered to true-up payments.85 The trial
court granted MSB summary judgment requiring EP Energy to amend the
leases and pay true-up bonuses.86 The court also denied MSB's summary
judgment motion on delay rentals because neither MFN-triggering lease
provided for higher delay rentals.87 After stipulating MSB's damages as
$41,034,055 for all leases, the trial court rendered final judgment for MSB,
concluding EP Energy breached the MFN clause and ordered it to amend
the leases and pay the total damages.88
The MFN clause provided that if during the existence of the lease, EP
Energy acquired a third-party lease on a portion of the leased premises with
a bonus higher than the bonus being paid to MSB, EP Energy would
execute an amendment “effective” as of the date of the third-party
triggering lease to provide MSB “thereafter” the same percentage per net
mineral acre bonus.89 The parties agreed that EP Energy acquired a lease
which triggered the MFN Clause and was required to amend the MSB
leases to provide that MSB shall receive the same percentage of bonus
thereafter.90
On appeal, the court rejected EP Energy’s argument that it was only
obligated to make payments beginning on the lease’s effective dates
because the plain, ordinary, and general meaning of “effective” and
“thereafter” provides that EP Energy is required to execute an amendment
to the leases, operative on the date EP Energy enters into a third-party lease,
to provide to MSB afterward the same higher bonus per net mineral acre as
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
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it provided in a third party lease.91 Further, the Court stated that the plain
language of the MFN clause required no prospective or retroactive
construction because “it provided straightforward instruction.”92 The court
read the MFN clause to provide that if the bonus amount is higher in a
triggering lease, EP Energy must (1) execute an amendment to the leases to
provide the same bonus per net mineral acre as the triggering lease and (2)
pay the same bonus per net mineral acre as the triggering lease.93
The Court also rejected EP Energy’s argument that the surrounding
circumstances supported its argument that after it entered into triggering
leases, it was only required to pay bonuses on acreage that it had paid
bonuses on from that point forward because regardless of circumstances,
“the parties edited drafts of lease terms, including the MFN clause, and the
resulting lease terms represented a bargained-for exchange.”94 As such, the
Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling on summary judgment in favor of
MSB.95
However, the Court did find that the trial court erred in granting MSB’s
request for specific performance in addition to damages because MSB
offered no evidence to establish that the monetary damages sought would
not be an adequate remedy at law.96 Accordingly, the court reversed the
portion of the trial court's judgment that ordered EP Energy to sign the lease
amendment, and then denied judgment on MSB's request for specific
performance. In all other respects, the trial court's judgment was affirmed.97
G. Samson Exploration, LLC v. Bordages 98
In 1999, members of the Bordage family executed an oil and gas lease in
favor of Samson Exploration, LLC, as Lessee, covering 95 acres in Hardin
County, Texas.99 No well was drilled on the 95-acre tract, but the tract was
included in two units.100 In 2001, Samson received a title opinion which
noted that between 1938 and 1943 the then-owners conveyed an undivided
one-third interest in the property to the Bordages, but the deed was never
recorded in Hardin County.101 Samson requested documentation from the
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id. at *9.
Id.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *12.
Id. at *13.
Id.
09-20-00174-CV, 2022 WL 120004 (Tex. App.–Beaumont Jan. 13, 2022).
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
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Bordages in May of 2002.102 The Bordages advised Samson that there was
never a deed, but provided a copy of a Certificate of Interest which they
believed to be sufficient to vest the Bordages with beneficial or equitable
title to the one-third interest.103 In September of 2002, Samson re-sent its
May letter with a stamp marking it as a “second request.”104 In October of
2007, Samson received an affidavit from the transferring owners and a
second copy of the Certificate of Interest.105 In December of 2007, Samson
began paying royalties to the Bordages on one of the two units, without
payment of late charges or interest.106
In 2005, most of the Bordages joined active litigation against Samson,
while the remaining landowners joined in 2006.107 The Bordages claimed
breach of lease agreements, failure to pay royalties, violation of the Texas
Natural Resources Code, unpaid late charges, and negligence.108 The trial
court ruled in favor of the Bordages on summary judgment, awarding total
damages of $12,955,919 which included $8,312,203 for accrued and unpaid
royalties.109
Samson raised two issues on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment against Samson and in failing to grant Samson's crossmotion for summary judgment and its motion for reconsideration; and (2)
the trial court miscalculated late charges through its misconstruction of the
late charge provisions of the leases.110
The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, stating that when it
construes an oil and gas lease, “we seek to enforce the parties’ intention as
they expressed it in the lease.”111 The court rejected Samson’s argument
that the lease only authorized a late charge on past due royalties, but not on
past due late charges.112 The lease provides that all past due royalties are
subject to “a Late Charge based on the amount due.”113 The court sought to
understand what “amount due” meant by reviewing the provision’s final
sentence which stated “any Late Charge that may become applicable shall

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *10 (quoting Tittizer v. Union Gas Corp., 171 S.W.3d 857, 860 (Tex. 2005)).
Id. at *14.
Id. at *12.
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be due and payable on the last day of each month.”114 Because the parties
chose to include language which specified when late charges commence
and when they become due and payable, the court found that late charges
were necessarily encompassed in the “amount due” on which the late
charge is based.115 According to the court, when this provision is read in
conjunction with the provision specifying the time for royalty payments, the
plain language of the lease states that late charges commence at the
beginning of each month, become due and payable at the end of each
month, and do not limit a late charge to past due royalties.116 Further, the
court ruled that the contract’s language authorized compounding the late
charges on the basis that the late charges become part of the “amount
due.”117
The court also rejected Samson’s argument that royalties were not due
prior to 2007 because of a title dispute.118 The lease did not contain
language about to whom payments would be made, but rather by when
payments should be made.119 The court stated that the “plain language of
the lease does not excuse non-payment of late charges in the event of a title
dispute.120 According to the court, no language in the lease supports
Samson's interpretation of excusing nonpayment of late charges in the event
of an ownership issue.121 Further, even if the lease had provided an excuse
for non-payment of late charges, the summary judgment evidence did not
show the existence of a bona fide dispute regarding the title.122 As such, the
lease permitted the compounding of late charges, did not provide an
exception to the payment of late charges, and no bona fide title dispute
existed that would alter when the royalties were due under the lease. 123 The
Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the Bordages family.124

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at *13.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *14-15.
Id. at *19.
Id. at *17.
Id. at *18.
Id.
Id. at *19.
Id. at *19.
Id. at *20.
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H. Ammonite Oil and Gas Corporation v. Railroad Commission of Texas 125
This case concerns an appeal by Ammonite Oil and Gas Corporation
(“Appellant’). Appellant filed an application to force pool its certain
minerals interest in State-owned riverbed acreage operated by EOG
Resources Inc. under the Mineral Interest Pooling Act (the “Act”). The
Texas Railroad Commission (the “Commission) denied the application.
Appellant appealed and the trial court affirmed the order. Appellant
appealed.
Appellant is the lessee of acreage in the Frio River owned by the state of
Texas. EOG drilled 16 wells on an adjacent property. Appellant offered to
pool their acreage with EOG, which EOG rejected. Appellant then filed 16
applications to pool under the Mineral Interest Pooling Act asserting that
“forced pooling was necessary under MIPA to prevent the waste of its
riverbed minerals and to protect its correlative right to a fair share of the
common reservoir's production.”126 The Commission consolidated the
applications.
EOG objected to the application and a hearing was held before the
Commission. The hearing examiners recommended approval of 15 of the
applications for forced pooling. However, the Commission rejected the
recommendations and denied all 16 applications. In doing so, it issued the
following conclusions of law:
1. Pursuant to Texas Natural Resources Code 102.016,
notice of the hearing was given to all interested
parties . . . .
2. Ammonite failed to make a fair and reasonable offer to
voluntarily pool as required by Texas Natural Resources
Code 102.013.
3. Force pooling will not prevent waste, protect correlative
rights, or avoid the drilling of unnecessary wells as
required by Texas Natural Resources Code 102.011.
4. The Commission lacks authority to issue a compulsory
pooling order for the Naylor Jones Unit 26 No. 2H
because Ammonite's proposed unit size exceeds the
limits authorized by Texas Natural Resources Code
102.011 and cannot be reformed.
125. No. 04-20-00465-CV, 2021 WL 4976324, at *1 (Tex. App.–San Antonio Oct. 27,
2021).
126. .Id.
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5. Because the applicant failed to meet its burden of proof
to prove that the granting of the application is necessary
to prevent waste, protect correlative rights, or avoid the
unnecessary drilling of wells, the necessary prerequisites for MIPA pooling have not been established.
Ammonite's applications for all sixteen (16) units must
be denied.127
Appellant filed for judicial review of the Commission’s order, and the
trial court affirmed the decision. On appeal, Appellant argued the
Commission ruling was a misinterpretation of the Act and deviated from its
own precedent. Moreover, Appellant contended that the district court erred
in failing to address the issues of law.
The appellate court affirmed. Under MIPA, an application for a forced
pooling order must be preceded by a fair and reasonable offer to the
owner/operator of the wells.128 A mineral owner must meet one of three
statutory requirements to have its MIPA application approved; it must
establish that the force-pooled unit(s) would “(1) avoid the drilling of
unnecessary wells, (2) protect correlative rights, or (3) prevent waste.”129
The Court held that the Commission’s order was based on evidence and
reason; that Ammonite’s voluntary pooling offers were not fair and
reasonable in the Commission’s discretion and that Ammonite failed to
meet its burden of establishing one of the three statutory requirements.130
I. Carl v. Hilcorp Energy Company 131
Anne Carl and Anderson White, as Co-Trustees of the Carl/White Trust
(“Plaintiff”), is the successor-in-interest lessor. Defendant, Hilcorp Energy
Company (“Hilcorp”) is the successor-in-interest lessee. The Defendant
operates two wells on the leased premises. The Plaintiff alleged that
Defendant underpaid royalties in violation of its lease. The section
specifically at issue here is Paragraph 3. Paragraph 3 states:
[Gas Royalty Clause] The royalties to be paid by Lessee are: . . .
(b) on gas, including casinghead gas or other gaseous substance,
produced from said land and sold or used off the premises or in
the manufacture of gasoline or other product therefrom, the
market value at the well of one-eighth of the gas so sold or
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at *2.
Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. § 102.013.
Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. § 102.011.
Ammonite at *3.
No. 4:21-CV-02133, 2021 WL 5588036, (S.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2021).
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used . . . [Free Use Clause] Lessee shall have free use of oil, gas,
coal, wood and water from said land, except water from Lessors'
wells, for all operations hereunder, and the royalty on oil, gas
and coal shall be computed after deducting any so used.132
Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract originates under the Class Action
Fairness Act.133 Plaintiff specifically alleged that Paragraph 3 requires a
royalty to be paid for any gas used off the premises. Moreover, they claim
the Free Use Clause allows gas to be used only on the leased premises.
Here, the Plaintiff alleged that defendant used gas off the premises to power
equipment for hydrocarbon processing, requiring royalty to be paid on all
such gas used.
In response, Hilcorp argued that it did not violate the clause and that the
case should be dismissed. Hilcorp argued that this is an “at the well” lease,
and that with respect to an “at the well” lease royalty, payments do not need
to be paid for gas used to process the lease’s raw gas for use in downstream
sale.
Here, the court first considered the concepts of gas production, and
“market value at the well” leases. The Court explained, “[p]roduction is the
process of bringing minerals to the surface. Production for raw gas occurs
at the wellhead. A royalty payment, which represents a lessor's fractional
share of production from a lease, may be calculated at the wellhead or at
any downstream point, depending on the lease terms.”134
The Court specifically focused on the concept of “market value,” which
they explain, means “the price a willing buyer under no compulsion to buy
will pay to a willing seller under no compulsion to sell.”135 Moreover, they
found,
The preferred method of determining market value is by using
actual sales that are “comparable in time, quality, quantity, and
availability of marketing outlets.” When comparable sales data
are unavailable, an alternative methodology for determining
“market value” at a specified valuation point is the “net-back” or
“workback” method. When the location for measuring market
value is “at the well” (or equivalent phrasing), the workback
method permits an estimation of wellhead market value by using
the proceeds of a downstream sale and subtracting
132. Id., citing to Lease Agreement, Doc. 13-1, ¶ 3 (emphasis added).
133. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
134. Carl at *2, citing BlueStone Nat. Res. II, LLC v. Randle, 620 S.W.3d 380, 386-87
(Tex. 2021).
135. Id., citing Randle, 620 S.W.3d, at 388.
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postproduction costs incurred between the well and the point of
sale.136
Additionally, the Court pointed to a recent Texas Supreme Court decision
which held that under a “market value lease” postproduction costs are
normally deducted from the royalty.137
The Court held that the Plaintiff’s arguments were unavailing regarding
the Gas Royalty Clause. Applying the proper methodology, the Court held
that postproduction costs must be deducted from the royalty.138 The Court
came to this conclusion in part because the gas used off the premises is used
to power equipment for said postproduction activities. In turn, the court
found that these “off-lease” uses had been properly deducted from the
royalty calculation.
The Court also rejected the Plaintiff's arguments regarding the Free Use
Clause. The Plaintiff argued that this clause allowed the Defendant free use
of gas for operations only on the lease. The Defendant countered that “these
provisions do not preclude lessees from deducting gas used as fuel or inkind payment for post-production services in ‘market value at the well’
leases.”139 The Court found the cases the Defendant cited to be persuasive
here. Specifically, a 1982 Fifth Circuit case in which that court “found that
‘the market value at the well’ language controlled and that the lease
operator could deduct the cost of gas used as fuel for post-production
services.140 In turn, it agreed with the Defendant that the proper application
of the “market value at the well” provision is the critical clause.141
In response, the Plaintiff looked to the recent Randle decision from the
Texas Supreme Court. It argued that this decision set a standard in which
“‘sold or used off the premises’ and ‘free use’ clauses require the lessee to
pay full royalty for gas used off the premises, regardless of whether the
lease agreement contains a ‘market value at the well’ provision.”142
However, the Defendant responded that this interpretation of Randle was
incorrect. They contend that in Randle, the lease agreement did not include
a “market value at the well” provision that allowed for the deduction of
136. Id. (internal citations omitted).
137. Id. at *3. (citing Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 122-23 (Tex.
1996); Burlington Res. Oil and Gas Co. LP v. Texas Crude Energy, 573 S.W.3d 198, 203
(Tex. 2019)).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at *3, (citing Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F. Supp.
957, 958 (S.D. Miss. 1982)).
141. Id. at *4.
142. Id.
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post-production costs. Here, the Court agreed that Randle, did not
supersede previously cited cases such as Burlington Resources, French,
or Heritage.
For the reasons above, the Court granted Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
without prejudice.
J. Fitzgerald as Trustee for Jackson Family Mineral Trust v. Apache
Corporation 143
Fitzgerald (“Plaintiff”) (a successor-in-interest lessor of the lease at
issue) brought suit against Apache (“Defendant”) (a well operator and
successor-in-interest lessee of the lease at issue). At issue was Plaintiff’s
allegation that Defendant pays “no royalty” for gas used off-lease. Plaintiff
contends that two lease clauses require such payment be made.
Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant typically used gas off the leased
premises for postproduction purposes. Plaintiff cited two sections of the
lease, which they contend required Defendant to pay royalties. First, the
“market value at the well clause” and the “on-lease free-use clause.”
Plaintiff contended both clauses require payment for off-lease gas use. In
turn, Plaintiff brought a single claim for breach of lease, as an individual
and as the representative of a class including:
All current royalty owners in Texas wells where Apache
Corporation (including its affiliated predecessors) was the
operator (or a working interest owner who marketed its share of
gas and directly paid royalties to the royalty owners) from April
1, 2011 to the date Class Notice is given under oil and gas leases
which expressly contain the off-lease use of gas royalty clause,
the on-lease free use clause, or both.144
Apache rejected the Plaintiff’s argument and argued that the case should be
dismissed. Specifically, the Defendant claimed no royalty is owed on
postproduction costs. Indeed, both parties agree that the “non-payment” at
issue only concerns gas used in postproduction.
The Court noted that the facts here are nearly identical to another 2021
case, Carl v. Hilcorp Energy Company. There, the court found for the
defendants. Here, similar to the analysis in Carl, the Court looked to
Bluestone, Burlington, and Randle for the proper method of interpreting a

143. No. CV H-21-1306, 2021 WL 5999262 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2021).
144. Id. at *2.
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contract. Specially, it found that “a court's objective is to ‘ascertain the
parties’ true intentions as expressed in the writing.”145
First, the Court analyzed “market-value-at-the-well royalty,” and “free
use on-lease” clauses. In interpreting the proper application of “marketvalue-at-the-well royalty, the Court reasoned that “[m]arket value, if
possible, is calculated by using ‘actual sales that are “comparable in time,
quality, quantity, and availability of marketing outlets.”’”146 Considering
the findings in Burlington, the Court further reasoned:
When the location for measuring market value is ‘at the well’ (or
equivalent phrasing), the workback method permits an
estimation of wellhead market value by using the proceeds of a
downstream sale and subtracting postproduction costs incurred
between the well and the point of sale. Although parties may
define post-production costs any way they choose, the term
generally applies to processing, compression, transportation, and
other costs expended to prepare raw oil or gas for sale at a
downstream location.147
The Court also relied heavily on these cases in their analysis of the “free
use” clause. Here, the clause specially states: “Lessee shall have free use of
oil, gas, . . . for all operation hereunder; and the royalty on oil or gas shall
be computed after deducting any so used.”148 The Court gave heavy weight
to the recent Texas case Randle. It noted that the court there differentiated
between gas used off premises by third parties and gas used off lease that is
returned to the premises to power infrastructure on the lease. While the
former requires royalty payment, the latter does not.
Next the Court analyzed the specifics of the lease at issue. First, the
“market value at the well” clause states:
The royalties to be paid Lessors are: . . . (b) on gas, including
casinghead gas or other gaseous substance, produced from said
land and sold or used off the premises or in the manufacture of
gasoline or other product therefrom, the market value at the well
of one-eighth (1/8) of the gas sold or used;149

145.
2021)).
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at *3 (citing BlueStone Nat. Res. II, LLC v. Randle, 620 S.W.3d 380, 387 (Tex.
Id. at *4.
Id. (citing Burlington, 573 S.W.3d at 203 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Id. at *4.
Fitzgerald, 2021 WL 5999262 at *2 (emphasis in original).
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Second, the “on-lease free-use clause” states:
Lessee shall have free use of oil, gas, wood, and water from said
land, except water from Lessors’ wells, for all operation
hereunder; and the royalty on oil or gas shall be computed after
deducting any so used.150
The Defendant argued that it has “no liability if it deducted only postproduction costs under a market value at the well lease.”151 Indeed, both
parties agreed that all gas at issue was used in postproduction or as
compensation to midstream operators. However, Plaintiff contended that
Defendant is “still liable for royalties on the gas used off-lease because the
market value at the well clause addresses only the valuation of the royalty
payment and does not address the amount of gas on which Apache owes a
royalty.”152
The court noted that the lease in question is materially similar to the
lease in Randle. However, Defendant distinguishes this case by the fact that
the lease in Randle did not have a “market-value-at-the-well” provision,
and so the Randle court only examined the issue of “free use” clauses.
Instead, the here court looked to Carl for guidance, reasoning “that the freeuse clause “can be read in harmony” with the market-value clause.”153
Therefore, even if the “free use” clause is found to only apply to gas used
on the premises, gas used off the premises may still be deducted if used in
postproduction.
Importantly, the Defendant argued the two provisions apply to different
types of gas usage. While the “free-use” clause addresses gas used on the
leased premises, the market-value provision concerns postproduction
wherever it occurs. Therefore, even if the “free use” clause is interpreted
similarly to that in Randle it would not be dispositive on the overall
question here.
The Court noted that the Defendant had conceded “whether the gas is
sold or the gas is used off lease, her royalty is based on the market value,
which requires the deduction of postproduction costs.”154 In turn, the Court
reasoned the Defendant failed to adequately explain why it would be owed
royalties on gas that is consumed in the postproduction process and receive
royalty payment at market value for gas that is sold. Looking to a Fifth
Circuit decision, the court explained, “[l]ogic and equity dictate that all of
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *7.
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the plant fuel value is a processing cost; none of this fuel survives to be
marketed by any of the working interest owners; by definition, it is all used
to facilitate the production of the gas that is sold.”155 Therefore, “if all the
gas used off lease is consumed in postproduction services for gas that is
sold, there is no amount of remaining gas used for which a royalty payment
could be calculated.”156
The Court held that the Plaintiff’s only assertions were that the
Defendant deducted costs that were permitted to be deducted. The Plaintiff
failed to make any claim that the Defendant underpaid royalties. Therefore,
the Plaintiff has failed to make a claim for breach. In turn, the Motion to
Dismiss was granted and the court dismissed the case without prejudice.
K. In re Eagleridge Operating, LLC 157
In March of 2022, the Supreme Court of Texas heard a premises-defect
case in which Eagleridge Operating, LLC (“Eagleridge”) sought mandamus
relief from a trial court order that struck its responsible-third-party
designation under Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code.158
Aruba Petroleum Inc. (“Aruba”) owned a minority working interest in a
wellsite, served as operator of record, and received an operations fee from
the majority working-interest owner, USG Properties Barnett II, LLC
(“USG”).159 Aruba was responsible for operating, drilling, and servicing the
wellsite for four years until April 2017.160 At that time, Aruba conveyed its
ownership to USG and stopped servicing as the operator.161 Prior to such
conveyance, USG entered into a written contract with Eagleridge to serve
as operator, but Eagleridge did not assume control of the wellsite until May
2017.162 A few months later, the gas line ruptured and injured plaintiff
Earmon Lovern.163 The Loverns filed suit, and the trial court granted the
motion to strike and the motion for partial summary judgment, prompting
Eagleridge to seek mandamus relief, which the court of appeals denied.164
In a split decision, that court held that Occidental Chemical Corp. v.
155.
1990)).
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. (citing Piney Woods Country Life Sch. v. Shell Oil Co., 905 F.2d 840 (5th Cir.
Id.
642 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. 2022).
Id.
Id. at 521.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 523.
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Jenkins precludes Eagleridge’s argument that Aruba should be designated
as the responsible third party.165 The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed
only whether precedent in Occidental precludes Aruba’s responsibility for
any defects in the pipeline.166
The Court reasoned that a responsible third party is any person who is
alleged to have caused or contributed to causing in any way the harm for
which recovery of damages is sought, whether by negligent act or omission,
by any defective or unreasonably dangerous product, by other conduct or
activity that violates an applicable legal standard, or by any combination of
these.167
The Court explained, as it did in Occidental, that a property owner may
have responsibility for a dangerous condition on its property whether
created by the owners or others, but the owner’s duty is not the same as an
independent contractor’s.168 Under this theory, an owner has premises
liability.169 Under premises liability principles, a property owner generally
owes those invited onto the property a duty to make the premises safe or to
warn of dangerous conditions as reasonably prudent under the
circumstances.170 However this duty generally runs with the ownership or
control of the property and upon a sale ordinarily passes to the new
owner.171
The Court rejected Eagleridge’s argument that Aruba was an
independent contractor because it received payment from USG, as Aruba’s
receipt of compensation for its efforts as operator of record neither
transforms it from an owner into an independent contractor or third party
nor materially distinguishes the facts of this case from Occidental.172 Being
financially compensated for managing your property interests in a tenancy
in common does not give rise to a third party relationship with respect to
the property, but is more akin to reapportioning revenues and expenses
among co-owners.173 The Court held that an agreement strictly between
tenants in common to allocate expenses, assign responsibilities, and
compensate for disparate efforts in a joint endeavor does not create an
exception to Occidental as to improvements each party would otherwise
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Occidental Chem. Corp. v. Jenkins, 478 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. 2016).
Id. at 525.
Id. (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.011(6)).
Id. at 527.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 529.
Id.
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have been free to construct without the consent of the other.174 As such, the
Court denied Eagleridge’s mandamus petition.175
L. Shirlaine West Properties Limited v. Jamestown Resources, L.L.C.176
Shirlaine West Properties Ltd. involves a dispute over the allocation of
postproduction costs in royalty valuations.177 Shirlaine (lessor) filed suit
against Jamestown (lessee) alleging underpayment of royalties, contending
that the lease unambiguously provides that royalty are not subject to direct
or indirect postproduction costs.178 The court held that the lessor’s royalty
interest was burdened by postproduction costs and that the royalty clause in
the contract unambiguously fixed the wellhead as the valuation point for
market value royalty calculations.179
In its analysis, the court acknowledged the royalty clause principles
developed in Bluestone.180 These include that unique words and phrases
about royalties in oil and gas leases may mean something different than
they appear, may mean nothing at all, or may be altered from their unique
meaning with other contract terms.181 It depends on “whether the words
used clearly express the intent of the parties to deviate from the traditional
meanings.”182
While leases that calculate royalties based on market value at the
wellhead generally burden the lessor’s royalty with postproduction costs,
the court identified two exceptions that related to sentence one and two of
the royalty clause.183 These exceptions included “proceeds” leases and
“amount realized” leases.184 In Hyder, a proceeds lease was found—the gas
royalty language allowed a royalty of “25% of the price actually received
by the Lessee”—that was “free and clear of all production and postproduction costs and expenses.”185 The royalty did not bear postproduction
costs because it was based on the price the lessee actually received, not the
174. Id.
175. Id. at 530.
176. No. 02-18-00424-CV, 2021 WL 5367849 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth Nov. 18, 2021).
177. Id. at *1.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at *4.
181. Id. (citing Bluestone Nat. Res. II, LLC v. Randle, 601 S.W.3d 848, 855 (Tex. App.–
Fort Worth 2019); Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co. LP v. Tex. Crude Energy, LLC 573
S.W.3d 198, 203-04 (Tex. 2019)).
182. Id.
183. Id. at *4-5.
184. Id. at *5.
185. Id. (citing Chesapeake Expl. L.L.C. v. Hyder, 483 S.W.3d 870, 871 (Tex. 2016)).
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market value at the well.186 In Warren, the “amount realized” clause would
have allowed the calculation of royalty based on the price actually received
by the Lessee without the proceeds being net of postproduction costs.187
However, these “proceeds” and “amount realized” exceptions were not
helpful for Shirlaine because the royalty clause, according to sentences one
and two, fixed “market value as the measure of value and set the location of
the value at the point of sale,” and it was “uncontroverted that the point of
sale of the gas in question was at the wellhead.”188
Other language in the royalty clause also attempted to prevent royalties
from being subject to postproduction costs.189 However, the court
considered sentences four, five, and six of the leases to be surplusage
because the value at the well was already net of reasonable marketing
costs.190 Sentence seven of the royalty clause became the central dispute of
the case, providing that “[i]f Lessee realizes proceeds of production after
deduction for any expenses of production, gathering, dehydration,
separation, compression, transportation, treatment, processing, storage or
marketing, then the proportionate part of such deductions shall be added to
the total proceeds received by Lessee for purposes of this paragraph.”191
Interpretating sentence seven to mean that Lessors were entitled to have
postproduction expenses added back into the total proceeds would have
been in conflict with sentences one and two.192
The court, quoting Valence, decided to harmonize the royalty clause in
an effort to prevent any provisions from being rendered meaningless.193 In
doing so, it determined that sentence seven was not applicable.194 “Finding
the lease agreement unambiguous, no evidence of breach of the lease
agreement, and no damages caused by any alleged breach,” the court
affirmed the judgment for Jamestown Resources.195

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
Id. (citing Warren v. Chesapeake Expl. L.L.C., 759 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2014)).
Id. at *5-6.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id. (quoting Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 662 (Tex. 2005)).
Id.
Id.
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